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ABSTRACT 
Standard risk assessments are used to define and prioritize threats within a 
sector.  However, the rising number of cybersecurity risks in maritime are 
often temperamental to a range of environmental, technical, and social 
factors.  A change during an incident can significantly alter the risks and, 
consequently, the incident outcomes.  Therefore, agile, changing risk profiles 
are becoming more necessary in the modern world.  In addition to static and 
dynamic, maritime operational risks can be affected by cyber, cyber-physical, 
or physical elements.  This demonstrates the equal use of information and 
operational technology (IT/OT); however, most quantitative risk assessment 
frameworks focus on one or the other.  This is not ideal, based on 
technological trends in the maritime sector.  This article explores the factors 
that affect maritime cyber-risk and examines popular risk frameworks to see 
whether important maritime-related elements are unaccounted for.  These 
findings are further examined with the results of a survey we conducted to 
assess the situational awareness of the sector around cyber-risks in maritime.  
Suggestions for future work on are then made based on our findings.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The maritime transportation sector, worth trillions, moves 90% of the world's 
goods using widespread port infrastructure and fleets of unique, often 
specialized, ships.  These ships traverse international waters and carry tons of 
cargo and millions of passengers every year. Better technology on-board and 
at port continue to improve operations, however, it exposes assets and people 
to a complex, diverse, range of cyber-risks. Overall, the top maritime risk is 
considered to be “business interruptions” (Allianz, 2018).  However, more 
recently as technology improves, cyber risks in the maritime sector are rising 
quickly to pose a considerable threat, jumping from 15th to 2nd highest risk in 
just five years (Allianz, 2018).  While a significant shift in risk, the situational 
awareness of the sector is still lacking.  In a recent survey conducted by the 
authors (see Appendix Q17), participants believed by 78% that raising the 
general situational awareness of maritime cybersecurity would help reduce 
risk. This is important, as the vulnerabilities of modern ships and ports could 
lead to massive losses.   While the recent Costco (Rajamanickam, 2018) and 
Maersk (Maersk, 2017) incidences have drawn attention to the importance of 
cyber-risk management in the maritime industry, there is still little 
understanding on what that means, fully, or how that should be establish.  
  
In the past, when other industries have faced similar increases in cyber-risks, 
many adopted methods of risk assessment and mitigation based on an 
awareness their unique issues. In this aspect, the maritime sector is behind the 
curve, partially due to a slower embrace of technological advancement.  This 
gap is quickly closing, however, with even more maritime technology 
changes in the near future (see Section 5).  This sector has now reached the 
point where must, more seriously, gain better situational awareness and risk 
assessment capabilities.  To gather more information on both topics, this 
article explores how maritime cyber risks are different from other sectors, and 
evaluates general awareness of the risks by conducting, and sharing results 
of, our maritime cyber-risk survey.  Generally speaking, quantitative risk 
assessment is popular for managing risk and has been used to analyse only 
the physical risks to maritime ships (Chai, Jinxian, & Xiong, 2017). The first 
step to better risk assessment, is to address the gap in understand between 
physical risks and cyber risks, specifically in maritime.  Second, most 
assessment methods have the disadvantage of being entirely static, failing to 
adapt as risks change.  This lack of dynamic assessments has contributed loss 
of life (BP, 2005), and is another area we wish to increase awareness in. 
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While existing risk-assessment methods evaluate physical risks, maritime 
must also include the newer cyber-aspects of risk.  This assertion is made 
based on the survey conducted as a part of this paper to understand what 
influences maritime risks.  In summary, the purpose of this article is to: 
1) Improve the situational awareness of the maritime risk landscape;  
2) Examine how maritime risk can be modelled in terms of cyber, 
physical, static, and dynamic factors; 
3) Determine if the necessary elements are accounted for in existing risk 
assessment frameworks; 
4) Discuss survey results and future work. 
For our third aim, this article examines three risk assessment frameworks; the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, i.e. NIST, (Gary, Alice, & 
Feringa, 2002) (Stouffer, Pillitteri, Lightman, Marshall, & Adam, 2015), 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Lui, Lui, & Liu, 2013), and MaCRA the 
Marine Cyber-Risk Assessment (Tam & Jones, 2019b).   
 
2 BACKGROUND  
Cybersecurity in the modern maritime industry is still a relatively new 
concept (BIMCO, 2016) with individuals becoming more aware as 
Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) systems 
evolve across ships and at port.  Land based port infrastructure itself has had 
its largest advancements centered on IT.  On ships and offshore structures, 
however, IT and OT have been upgraded more equally over the last few years, 
often converging.  While the sector as a whole is very familiar with using 
physical risk assessments, there has been little awareness raising, or action, 
against cyber-related risks.  The purpose of this section is to understanding 
the current state of technology in maritime, current risk assessment 
methodology, and the sector’s current awareness levels of the problem.  These 
concepts will then be broken down further in the following sections. 
 
2.1 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Risk assessment methods can typically be divided into two core methods, 
qualitative or quantitative.  Qualitative assessment prioritizes individual risks 
through the analysis of occurrence probabilities, while quantitative 
numerically analyses risk by assigning numerical risk values.  The majority 
of current maritime risk assessments, for physical-based risks like collision, 
are based on probability statistics.  These have been, and still are, very reliable 
as they supported by an extensive history with many statistics (Jakub, et al., 
2014) (Nordstrom, et al., 2016) (Goerlandt & Montewka, 2015). Conversely, 
it is the lack of history and situational awareness of cyber-related risks in 
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maritime that makes it very difficult to produce qualitative risk assessments 
for maritime cyber-risks.  Currently there very little data because of limited 
reporting abilities (Tam & Jones, 2019a) as well as a short history.  
  
Since there is not enough historical maritime cyber incident data for 
qualitative assessments, and there will not be enough data in the future either 
if awareness and practices are not improved soon, this paper focuses on 
quantitative approaches. The pros and cons of quantitative depend on the 
quality of elements being modelled or assessed; their relevance, the quantity, 
set size, and overall coverage.   When done right, quantitative approaches can 
be more objective when derived from solid facts. When done poorly (e.g., the 
financial market in the early 2000's) a limited set of modelled elements means 
the model is unable to consider unusual, tail end, risks.  Quantitative models 
often reduce these issues by choosing a smaller, and very specific scenario to 
analyse (Flammini, Gaglione, Nicola, & Pragliola, 2008) (Chai, Jinxian, & 
Xiong, 2017).  These also often limit the risk analysis problem to a specific 
asset, geographic location (e.g., harbour), or outcome (e.g., oil spill).   
 
A quantitative risk model that encompass more elements can be more detailed 
and versatile; however, the performance overhead could reduce its usefulness.  
In addition, if complex models rely heavily on humans there is the potential 
that human errors can be introduced.   Complex models can also be difficult 
to understand, but it has been shown that graphical outputs like CORAS (M. 
S. Lund, 2010), can mitigate that issue for users (K. Labunets, 2014).  
 
2.2 MARITIME TECHNOLOGY 
The maritime sector as long been a critical component in modern global 
transportation and trade. In its past, piracy and other physical threats were a 
common threat, and so assessing those threats is well established.  Risk 
factors like geographic location (e.g., Strait of Malacca), cargo value, and 
defences (e.g., armed guards) helped individuals assess the risks of certain 
voyages. The introduction of electronic and digital systems began with sonar 
on ships at the start of 1900's, which was quickly followed by more digital 
systems across the sector.  On the shore side of business, shipping was 
actually one of the first business to embrace computers to keep track of 
ledgers and the tables of the UK Nautical Almanac.  Each new system 
introduced decrease workloads, increased accuracy, and improved physical 
safety.  The negative aspect to the then speedy growth was the development 
of a complex computing environment with no cybersecurity built-in.  This 
created vulnerabilities in both IT and OT both technically and through human-
system interactions.  Unlike the cyber aspect, human error in maritime has 
been studied in some depth (Wingrove, 2016) (Rothblum, 2000).   
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As ships grew larger and more sophisticated, as seen with the evolution of the 
modern oil tanker since the 1870's, the growth of containerization since the 
1970's, and the evolution of passenger ships, the maritime risk landscape has 
changed due to all the new cyber and cyber-physical risks.  This article 
defines cyber-physical threats as events with both cyber and physical 
elements (Tam & Jones, 2018b) which come from the emergence and 
convergence of information technology (e.g., anti-collision software) and 
operational technology (e.g., autonomous cargo winches).  All the physical 
operations required in maritime transportation means the amount of physical 
and cyber factors are fairly even, particularly when compared to more IT-
orientated businesses like finance.  The convergence of IT/OT most closely 
mirrors other transportation sectors like rail and air; however the magnitude 
of cargo volume and distance/time travelled is significantly higher in the 
maritime sector. Lastly, the most recent introduction of internet, complex 
networking like Internet-of-things and wireless communications has 
compounded the existing cyber-related risks in maritime (see more in Section 
5). Figure 1 illustrates how IT/OT/human elements are relatively, evenly, 
distributed across ports and ship.  Here the categories of the IT and OT 
systems are relatively generic and may encompass several systems while 
providing background information, with details are to come later. 
 
3 Relevant Maritime Risk Factors 
This article has briefly discussed IT (e.g., data sharing), OT (e.g., physical 
operations), and the human element in a maritime environment.  These three 
have been considered the top categories of risk factors; however, each 
element belonging to these categories can be further categorized into static or 
Figure 1 IT, OT, and human elements on-ship and at port 
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dynamic, and physical or cyber factors that should be modelled to assess risk. 
This is particularly important in the maritime environment today, with the rise 
of cyber-physical systems (Stankovic, Lee, & Sha, 2010). This detail of 
element categorizing is unusual in related works, and will allow this research 
to assess how effective existing risk assessments can be for maritime.  It also 
raises situational awareness on how complex and unique the maritime cyber 
threat is, even compared to other transportation sectors like rail, car, and air. 
 
The risk factor compass in Figure 2 summarizes the following subsections by 
organizing elements of risk ranging across the physical, cyber, static, dynamic 
spectrum.  It also demonstrates how human, IT, and OT are biased to certain 
quadrants of the compass due to their inherent natures.  For example, OT 
systems tend to provide physical actions, and remote humans tend to affect 
dynamic cyber risks more than local crew or passengers.  This demonstrates 
how the unique set of these risk factors can create a distinct maritime risk 
landscape, one that is larger than what is currently addressed.  This is because 
the current situational awareness of cyber-risk is often fragmented into only 
human, IT, or OT categories and not assessed together.   Part of raising 
awareness on which risks require more attention is understanding potential 
attack outcomes.  The types of risk outcomes considered in this paper, which 
can be applied to human, IT, and OT entities, are denial-of-service (DoS), 
misdirect, damage, theft, and obfuscate.  Ultimately, these risks can result in 
outcomes such as loss of finance, loss of life, and environmental damage. 
Figure 2 Risk factor compass demonstrating range of elements involved 
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3.1 Static  
Each of the following subsections for static, dynamic, physical, and cyber 
factors will discuss how they affect risks within the human (H), IT and OT 
risk categories established earlier on.  For the interested reader, more details 
on human threats can be found in (BIMCO, 2016) (Tam & Jones, 2019b).   
  
For the purpose of this paper there are four types of human categories, local 
on-ship crew (crewL), remote operators working on land (operatorsR), on-ship 
passengers (passengersL), and the remaining, remote, non-operator people 
(¬operatorsR).  Local crew and passengers on the ship mean their physical 
safety is tied to the ship's location and safety.  As these people are unlikely to 
leave a ship mid-voyage, their history prior boarding are static factors.  For 
crew this includes their training, which is based on set standards.  While 
training standards change with the times (Wingrove, 2016), and there are 
slight variations across different cohorts and countries, the training for a crew 
member is relatively static at the point they are on a ship, as they are unlikely 
to receive significantly new training on-route. Conversely, while individual 
histories are static per voyage, people often disembark and embark at ports, 
meaning static is relative to the period examined.  Static human factors are 
important as they establish previous criminal records or vulnerabilities (e.g., 
health, finance).  Assessing human risk with both static and dynamic risk 
factors has been done previously in (Bonta, 1999) and (Beech, Friendship, 
Erikson, & Karl, 2002), although not applied directly to maritime, where 
static factors include history and dynamic factors include substance abuse.   A 
significant shift in maritime that shall occur in the future is remote control 
and autonomy (Yeomans, 2014), which may alter crew risk factors towards 
remote operators instead of local crew. Of the remote non-operator people, 
we must consider hackers and how they affect maritime cyber-risk.   
  
Much like how the amount and types of people on-board differ between ship 
types (e.g., cruise, cargo), on-board IT systems can also vary.  However, 
because of standards set by the IMO International Convention for Safety of 
Life at Sea (IMO, 1974), ships of similar types are mandated to have standard 
IT systems.   This is primarily determine by tonnage (e.g, gross tonnage), 
local or international waters, and the presence of passengers. Systems found 
in this sector can be loosely categorized into computers, navigation, cargo 
handling, communication (e.g., human to human, machine to machine), 
sensors, and monitoring.  The last two were previously combined in Figure 2 
as they possessed similar capture and network technology, however, their risk 
factors diverge more when considered in depth.  Because of existing 
standards, the static factors of IT systems are primarily their hardware, 
established networks, and protocols to use those networks.  Changes to these 
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factors happen less often than crew and, even if hardware is upgraded, the 
ship is unlikely to undergo these alterations during normal operations.  
Instead, retrofitting normally stalls normal operations.  Therefore, the main 
risks to consider with static elements, is “inherit” vulnerabilities in the supply-
chain and during maintenance. Such risks could be structural, where systems 
are physically vulnerable, or a cyber-vulnerability where a back door was 
intentionally or unintentionally built in for intruder access.  
  
When considering OT, this paper makes a distinction between hardware and 
mechanisms, although the latter could be considered a subset of the former.  
Here, the term hardware is used in the computing sense while mechanisms, 
like a propeller or winch, perform physical services.  We must also 
differentiate between propulsion and engineering, unlike Figure 2.  While the 
figure considered them nearly identical in terms of function and physical 
location on-board, risk factors in engineering have a much more diverse 
outcome and has more crew interaction.  This differentiation may be even 
more pronounced in the future, as ship engineering OT is becoming more 
sophisticated and converging with bridge IT (Man, Lundh, & MacKinnon, 
2018). Risks from these static features tend to result in accidents, as the 
vulnerability is constant, while dynamic factors can be changed to trigger an 
attack.  A flaw in computer hardware or OT mechanisms could lead to a 
damaging event, while a shortcoming in crew training could result in the 
mishandling of technology.  For example, there was a rise in engineering-
related accidents after a global shift to a new type of fuel (Allianz, 2018).   
  
3.2 Dynamic  
Being able to re-assess risk factors as they change is critical when analysing 
risk over a period of time.  In maritime, as voyages can take weeks or longer, 
and the life cycle of ship is an average of 20 years (ICS, 2018), at least 5 years 
more than the average aircraft.  Over such spans of times, elements are likely 
to change and the speed at which technology evolves today is quick.  
Therefore, to fully analyse relevant shipping risks across a number of ships, 
environments, and scenarios, dynamic factors must be considered.  Based on 
our survey, compared to static, there is less awareness of dynamic risks. 
  
When assessing the dynamic risks contributed by the human element, for 
those involved with shipping operations, remote and local, it is important to 
consider changes in “health”, i.e. mental, physical, and financial.  Threats to 
these could make an individual vulnerable to blackmail, manipulation by a 
malicious party, or become a malicious entity.  Examples of sextortion and 
blackmail have been seen on ships, as well as disgruntled employees 
becoming insider threats and passengers accidentally leaking information 
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(ESCGS, 2015) (USACIDC, 2017).  These factors can change at any time, 
triggered by an event such as a fishing email.  This is a common event on-
shore (e.g. at a port), but also happens on a ship.  Over a 5-day period, 
maritime mail gateways scan a million messages, 31,836 of which are spam 
and 2,196 contain actual malware or viruses (GTMaritime, 2017).  Besides 
non-crew and non-passenger, the risks of interest are malicious third party 
hackers (Tam & Jones, 2019b). Therefore, the dynamic elements worth 
measuring are their resources and goals, which can easily change. 
  
The primary dynamic factors for risk when considering maritime IT systems 
is their software and use.  The majority of IT ship systems, particularly those 
situated on the bridge (e.g., ECDIS, AIS, GMDSS, SSAS), are single purpose.  
The primary example is ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information 
System), which runs on a normal PC with an underlying OS (CyberKeel, 
2014).  This OS, normally Windows but occasionally Linux, has the capacity 
to do many things but is used purely for executing ECDIS as a navigation aid.  
Limited access to the underlying OS reduces risks, however, there are enough 
use-cases (e.g., updating charts) and misuse cases that can affect risks 
dynamically.   Unlike navigation, communication, monitoring (e.g., CCTV), 
and sensors have a plethora of applications.  Moreover, the design of sensor 
networks and the cost/simplicity of individual sensors today means that 
sensor networks are versatile, dynamic, and growing fast. This is becoming 
more relevant with Internet-of-Things (IoT) in maritime, particularity in 
smart container tags for shipping. How sensor readings are made and stored, 
and how they affect decisions (i.e., man-made and machine-made), affect the 
risk of the ship.   This includes cargo, which can be temperature sensitive or 
motion sensitive, people (e.g., carbon-dioxide levels), and the ship's physical 
and cyber safety.  Dynamic risks are currently better monitored in onshore 
businesses, as companies often employ active intrusion detection systems etc. 
  
The dynamic factors of operational technology are similar to IT in that they 
are also dependent on how they are accessed and controlled by other systems 
and people.  Unlike IT, however, the amount of OT being operated by humans 
is much lower, as it often is limited to a subset of the local crew, as they 
require training and access permissions.  Very few OT systems allow remote 
control at this point in time, whereas ship IT systems are more connected to 
the Internet.  This may change especially if more ships trend towards 
autonomy. As OT systems interact with the physical world, dynamic risks 
also include ship surroundings, such as sand banks and port structures.  As 
the ship moves and environments change, these factors for measuring risks 
are uniquely dynamic in transportation sectors, such as maritime.  As there is 
less awareness on ship-side risks, we tend to focus more on these aspects. 
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3.3 Cyber  
Measuring cyber risk is more established across other sectors, particularly 
financial, government, and IT companies.  In comparison, even to other 
transportation sectors, very little has been done in the maritime sector which 
has been estimated to be 20 years behind cybersecurity trends based on the 
rate of technological integration and current state of forensic and mitigation 
capabilities (Tam & Jones, 2019b). Moreover, the unique systems, protocols, 
and the movement across physical and cyber spaces mean that traditional 
methods of risk assessment cannot be easily applied without heavy 
modification.  However, the basic concept of communications human-to-
human, machine-to-human, and machine-to-machine still affect risk.  For 
human-cyber interactions, the factors to measure for risk are human 
identifications and security (e.g., IDs, passwords), who they communicate 
with, and how.  For remote operators and hackers this is the primary risk 
element to analyse.  This is also a significant factor for local crew and 
passengers with easier, local, access.  This same connection can be used to 
exploit people and propagate viruses (GTMaritime, 2017) (USACIDC, 2017). 
  
Regarding IT, specialized navigation systems like ECDIS have a set of 
protocols for using local networks and the Internet.  This limits the risks to 
the use of those protocols, and the security of the network.  Specialized 
communication technology like marine radio also have fixed use protocols, 
which can limit the possible risks. The simplicity of many of these systems 
still add a layer of “security”, as they are sometimes too simple for a pure 
cyber-attack.  However, this does not discount the possibility of using 
vulnerabilities to enable social engineering, blurring IT and human risks.  For 
more versatile networks, those hosting sensors, cameras and internet-based 
communications, they must consider user ID, passwords and user 
permissions.  Particularly for CCTV and other sensitive monitors or sensors, 
access control is an important part of managing risks.  The human element is 
also key here, as the rate and extremes of crew change are unique to a ship’s 
crew.  Not only is the timing and number of crew changes significant, but on 
international voyages the nationalities of the people can vary significantly.  
Hence, these elements would have a dynamic element as well. 
  
Of the three categories, OT on ships and at ports are the least Internet 
connected.  This does not mean that they are not connected to some kind of 
network (e.g., SCADA) or that this may not change in the future (Man, 
Lundh, & MacKinnon, 2018).  Access to these kinds of networks are mostly 
done at specific terminals, currently primarily locally or in engineering 
instead of an IT system central, like a ship bridge.  Even these networks have 
known vulnerabilities, but because of the current access requirements, it is 
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really only local crew that can affect these risks.   SCADA and similar 
networks types enable digital communications, although not with the same 
bandwidth and reach as the Internet, which can contribute to maritime cyber-
risks. This can be seen in similar, yet different, studies of SCADA security in 
other sectors like water, power, and rail (Cherdantseva, et al., 2016).  Because 
operational technology have both physical and cyber elements, their presence, 
scale in size, and uses mean that maritime security is equally, and uniquely, 
cyber and physically orientated when considering risk.   
 
3.4 Physical 
The last category of factors that affect maritime risk to be discussed in this 
paper are those in the physical category.  Here the risk for operators, local and 
remote, and passengers is measured by their physical health and the devices 
they bring on board.  This is becoming more important today with bring your 
own devices (BYOD) to work and the increase use of smart phones and USB 
enabled devices (e.g., cameras, flash drives) that can spread malware.  For 
physical outcomes, other risks can be tied to lithium batteries and other device 
components that can cause a physical hazard.  For all human risk elements, 
location is another risk factor.  For some this is static, as most cyber-attackers 
and remote operators do not change their physical location.  However for 
people on a ship, their location is dynamic which may alter the risks involved.  
For example, close proximity to terrorist or high-congestion zones will affect 
different risks.  Lastly, the human element affects IT/OT physical security as 
local crew, and sometimes passengers, can physically affect systems.   
  
For both information and operational technology, there are physical 
components that affect risk and are affected by risks.  The computing 
hardware of the systems need physical access security as well as cyber-access 
security.  In addition, systems that may be exposed to harsh environmental 
factors, like engine-focused sensors, have different risks.  This can also 
include sensing devices designed to monitoring volatile or hazardous cargo, 
or to measure the wind and water externally. The main difference between 
information and operational technology when considering physical risks is 
that, again, OT relies less on computing hardware and more on mechanisms 
like motors, robotic arms, and winches to perform tasks like propulsion and 
cargo handling.  Furthermore, there is currently less automation with OT 
devices, requiring more physical interactions and command sequences from 
crew.  However, this may change as technology improves, as discussed in 
Section 5.  Because OT interacts heavily with the environment (e.g., mooring 
to a pier, unloading cargo to a truck), physical elements that affect risk must 
be considered in order to fully assess maritime risks.  In addition to Figure 2, 
Table 1 lists examples of factors in all these categories. 
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Table 1 Categories and examples of maritime cyber-risks on ships 
 
 Risk Factor Static Dynamic Cyber Physical 
H
u
m
a
n
 E
le
m
en
t 
 
CrewL training, 
history* 
health, 
resources 
ID/password, 
internet use 
location, 
health, 
BYOD 
OperatorsR training, 
history* 
health, 
resources 
communication health 
PassengerL history* health, 
resources 
internet use, 
communication 
location, 
health, 
BYOD 
¬OperatorsR history resources, 
incentives 
internet use, 
communication 
location 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
 
Navigation protocols, 
hardware 
software, use software, 
network use 
hardware 
(e.g., AIS) 
Communication protocols, 
hardware 
software, use ID, software, 
access 
hardware 
(e.g., SSAS) 
Sensors hardware, 
network 
devices*, use, 
software 
network, access hardware, 
locations 
Monitoring hardware, 
network 
software, use access control, 
network 
hardware, 
access 
O
p
er
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
 
Propulsion hardware, 
mechanisms 
use, 
environment 
terminals, 
communication 
mechanisms 
(propeller), 
access 
Cargo contents*, 
history* 
environment 
(temp) 
tags, internal 
sensors 
location, 
health 
Moor/Anchor mechanisms, 
crew* 
protocols, 
environment 
protocols, 
communication 
mechanisms, 
location, 
crew 
Engineering crew*, 
mechanisms 
environment 
(temp) 
protocols, 
communication 
mechanisms 
(engines), 
environment, 
crew 
* - static if single voyage, dynamic if assessing longer period of time 
 
4 Assessments and Key Survey Results 
The aim of Section 3 was to expand the current awareness on what factors 
affect maritime cyber-risks.  With that, it is now possible to evaluate how well 
existing tools can assess these all of these relevant factors; cyber, physical, 
static and dynamic.  A useful assessment framework should also be able to 
prioritize risks, to determine the top risks so they can be dealt with 
immediately.  Establishing the abilities of existing tools will help further 
increase situational awareness and risk mitigation in this sector.  A useful tool 
should also be user-friendly, to aid human decisions.  Understanding whether 
the discussed risk frameworks meet these goals will guide recommendations 
on how maritime risk mitigation can be improved, including suggestions for 
adapting to likely future changes in the technology aboard ships and ports, 
such as increased autonomy, remote control, or the use of augmented reality. 
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4.1 Risk Assessment Framework Comparison 
The frameworks examined here are NIST, FMEA, and MaCRA.  There are 
many NIST frameworks for assessing various risks, however, this article will 
focus on NIST’s management of IT systems (Gary, Alice, & Feringa, 2002) 
and industrial control systems (Stouffer, Pillitteri, Lightman, Marshall, & 
Adam, 2015).  The latter is very similar OT systems; however this tool is 
specialized to a smaller manufacturing and distributions worksite, not entirely 
suitable for port-like infrastructure.  After a brief analysis and comparison, 
the next subsection on situational awareness uses the results of a cyber-risk 
survey, with participants primarily from the maritime sector, to support 
claims.  The full survey results can also be seen in the Appendix. Many 
existing frameworks also suggest using a number of specialists to combat risk.  
The problem with this is the scope of possible risk, even on-board, can be 
daunting.  It would be unreasonable to expect those levels of expertise on-
board, which is another issue to consider.  Lastly, the targeted audience in the 
NIST documents are predominately high-level management and security 
experts, which is less relevant to the range of audience types actively 
interested in maritime security (see Q1 in Appendix) and FMEA results can 
vary hugely depending on the investigation team. 
 
In terms of covering all relevant risk factors, the NIST IT risk framework 
nominally ignores OT and assumes that all physical and network security, 
once established, is set or static.  However, as we have seen, that assumption 
would not hold if systems are on moving ships.  Another concern is that the 
two NIST frameworks are would require extensive work to be combined in 
order cover both physical and cyber risks.  Moreover, the ICS risk framework 
is not versatile enough to assess OT maritime risks, and the IT framework is 
only suitable for business IT, which means a combined framework would 
likely not cover the full range of cyber/physical risks found in maritime. 
Another noticeable drawback of NIST frameworks is the lack dynamic risk 
measurements.  This has been a factor in OT incidences, or more specifically 
ICS, with some more severe outcomes including loss of life (BP, 2005).   
 
Similarly, FMEA does not consider dynamic features, however, this is more 
clearly by design, as its purpose is to identify all possible failures in a design, 
process, product, or service in its early stages of design or re-design (Lui, Lui, 
& Liu, 2013).  This makes FMEA a useful assessment tool for inherent flaws, 
or what this paper has labelled as static risk.  This makes FMEA and NIST 
useful in static risk assessment, physical or cyber, but less so with dynamic 
risks.  However, both these frameworks use gradients of risk in order to rank 
the risks they do analyse and prioritize risk management strategies.  While 
highly effective in most environments, because of the wide range of risks in 
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maritime cyber, they may be less effective.  If done thoroughly, FMEA could 
mitigate the dynamic risks once a ship is released, however, mitigating every 
risk no matter how minor is not cost effective, and during the lifetime of a 
ship significant unseen risks can arise as global circumstances change.  
 
Unfortunately, the human element plays a minor role in the NIST and FMEA 
frameworks. Again, NIST has a separate framework (i.e., SP 800-53 
Personnel Security) and it is not clear whether, if combined, they could cover 
the range of risks discussed for maritime.  FMEA has branched into human 
error (e.g., health-care), but it is also considered a separate use and not 
integrated with IT/OT assessments.  While future ships may shrink crew sizes, 
it is highly unlikely that crew will be completely removed from the sector.  It 
has been estimated that autonomous ships, with all life support systems 
removed, can reduce operational costs significantly (Morris, 2017), however, 
if a passenger ship already requires human safe conditions it is not worth the 
considerable risk of running those ships without a crew.   
 
The last framework evaluated is MaCRA, which in comparison is more 
theoretical but also more maritime orientated (see Table 2).  This framework 
is relatively new and not well established, however it was destined 
specifically for maritime as awareness grew for this subject.  Much focus has 
been placed on measuring dynamic risks as technology evolve (Tam & Jones, 
2018a) and as ships travel.  A drawback of this framework's early stages of 
development is the lack of widespread data to populate the model fully.  
While an effort has been made to assess features in the maritime context, 
MaCRA does not assess static risks as thoroughly as FMEA, as those are 
established outside of shipping operations.  A combined method may be 
possible, as FMEA would not need to be applied to maritime context, but 
instead be used to assess the manufacturing plants, processes and supply.   
Table 2 Comparing Risk Assessment Frameworks for Maritime 
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4.2 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
This survey conducted for this research (see Appendix) explores the idea that 
maritime cyber-risk is a mix of cyber, physical, static and dynamic elements 
and participants confirmed that these were relevant when assessing the risks 
of ships and ports.  Therefore, it is important to modify existing frameworks 
to work in the maritime ethos, or to continue develop maritime-specific 
frameworks until they are equally well known and usable. Participants were 
relatively evenly split into “I have a good awareness”, “I have moderate 
awareness” and “I have limited awareness” of cybercrime threats in the 
maritime industry.  However, in total, “little to no awareness” was ranked 
highest around 36%, and 78% of all participants claimed that raising general 
awareness of the topic would effectively reduce the risk of cyber-attacks. 
 
This survey consisted of 22 questions regarding maritime security factors, 
training, and use.  Of the 75 participants, 65% of them were mariners and port 
officers, roughly 14% were trainers/trainees, and the rest were primarily 
higher management and high ranking security specialists.  Participant 
minorities included maritime servicers, equipment providers, regulators, 
insurers, IT system owners or support, and academics. It is important to note 
that less than 15% of these participants identified themselves as being a part 
of the targeted audience of the two NIST frameworks this article has 
examined. Moreover, FMEA primarily targets manufactures only, meaning it 
is applicable to roughly 5% of those who were interested enough in maritime 
cybersecurity to take this survey.  While 41% of participants were not familiar 
with risk assessment in general 22%, however, knew of NIST.  The majority 
of participants said no (44%) and with 11% listing alternatives.  
 
Of these participants, 74% ranked crew-training standards as the top problem, 
with cybercrime and attacks ranking at second with 55% (Appendix Q2).  
Moreover, 60% of participants said that they have not received any training 
in cybersecurity, and participants ranked the need for maritime cyber training 
at 75 out of 100. Concerning cyber incidences, participants thought IT was 
the most vulnerable technology at 50%, however 41% believed IT and OT 
were equally, and significantly, at risk.  This demonstrates how situational 
awareness around physical-cyber risks need to be raised, and how both IT and 
OT need to be considered when assessing risk. As described previously, NIST 
assesses IT very well, but is less capable of assessing IT/OT and humans 
blended together and, therefore, less applicable to maritime.   
  
According to participants, their top three cybercrime concerns are malware 
(31%), phishing scams (13%) and web-based attacks (13%) (see Appendix 
Q11).  Other surveys have had similar results (IHS, 2018)  (Daszuta & Ghosh, 
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2018) (Daszuta & Ghosh, 2018).  However, these surveys rarely asked about 
what factors play into these risks.  Even though these concerns seem primarily 
IT-based, and therefore can be solved with IT cybersecurity solutions, in the 
maritime sector a wide range of physical, dynamic factors must be considered.  
While ship computers and internet activity are ranked as critical cyber-factors 
by 79% of participants, over 50% of participants also identified geo-location, 
route, cargo, crew, and insider threats as factors in risk (see Appendix Q10). 
These identified elements can be categorized as dynamic or static factors. 
More results can be found in the Appendix, to raise more awareness on how 
complex assessing maritime cyber-risks, across ships, ports, international 
lines, etc., can be.  In section 5, the future of technology of maritime will be 
discussed followed by some recommendations for improving cyber-risk 
awareness, analysis, and mitigation in the maritime sector.    
 
5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Before discussing future actions in maritime cyber-risk and sector-wide 
situational awareness of the risks, it is important consider the future of 
maritime technology in first, as it significantly affects future risks. 
 
5.1 FUTURE MARITIME TECHNOLOGY 
This section explores a few technologies and concepts that are gaining 
popularity in the maritime sector.  This aims to provide a cyber-risk 
perspective, particularly in the growing number of dynamic cyber aspects. 
 
Digital Twins 
More shipping companies are investing into the new “digital twin” concept.  
Sophisticated simulations of a physical asset (i.e. ship) drive this cost saving 
concept by creating a suite of simulations models that can interact on a 
common platform.  This platform would allow a number of simulation models 
to be loaded at one time and to interact with each other, allowing for a highly 
customizable platform for a multitude of analyses.  The primary aim of this 
is to improve operational efficiency and costs.  However, in terms of 
cybersecurity, the digital twin cannot easily enhance cybersecurity or risk 
analysis capabilities.  This is because only a few ship attributes are simulated 
and the simulation would not have the same cyber vulnerabilities as an actual 
ship.  Conversely, the digital twin itself could introduce issues.  While less 
likely and difficult to achieve, as digital twins consist solely of virtual parts 
and exists only in cyber-space, its digital files could be targeted in a cyber-
attack to affect decisions and actions.  In summary, while the digital twin will 
improve the building and monitoring of ships, it is unlikely to have significant 
positive, or negative, effects on how to assess maritime cyber-risks.   
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 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Tier 5 
Ship 
Autonomy 
No/minimal 
autonomy. 
Small crew 
required. 
Partial 
automation 
e.g. auto 
pilot. 
Conditional 
autonomy, 
potential 
interventions 
by crew 
Ship is 
mostly self-
running. 
remote crew 
rarely 
required. 
Complete 
autonomous 
operations in 
all potential 
settings. 
Remote 
operations 
Not required Not required Not required, 
but likely 
Required for 
operations 
Not required 
Sensors / 
IoT 
Needed to aid 
crew decision 
Needed to aid 
crew decision 
Needed to aid 
crew and 
autonomy 
decision  
Needed to 
aid remote 
crew and 
autonomy  
Needed for 
complete 
autonomous 
decisions 
 
Autonomous Ships and Ports 
Because of the growing demands on the maritime sector, many in the shipping 
industry have begun to consider autonomy as a solution.  Autonomy can be 
achieved at different levels of sophistication, and while there are established 
levels for autonomous cars, there is no formal definitions for the levels of 
autonomy in ships.  An adaption of SAE autonomous car definitions to ships 
can be found in (Tam & Jones 2018a) and in Table 3.  Because of the 
challenges in automating the various systems on board a ship, to perform a 
wide range of operations, it will be a while before fully autonomous ships 
represent a significant percentage of the global fleet (Batalden, Leikanger , & 
Wide, 2017).  However, despite the technological and legal complexities, the 
potential reductions of operation costs annually (estimated up to 90%) makes 
autonomous ships a desirable capability for future trade.  Besides technical 
challenges like autonomous navigation, international laws and the risk of the 
lost cargo and lives have complicated the progress toward fully autonomous 
ships, much like the struggle for autonomous cars.  Because of this, many 
organisations are currently working with lesser degrees of autonomy.   
 
Remote access and control, as discussed in the next subsection, will most 
likely be used in mid-tier autonomous ships.  With roughly 2GB of data stored 
per day on a modern ship (Brandy, 2018), autonomous vessels at tier 3 and 
tier 4 will likely generate even more data to support machine learning control 
algorithms or constantly feed data to remote crews.  While tier 3 autonomous 
ships may potentially have a reduced local crew that can analyse data and 
react, with a minimal crew it is likely that a remote specialised group will 
perform more complex operations that use remote access.  This can result in 
communication-based vulnerabilities, when data can be altered or denied.  
Table 3 Modified SAE autonomous car terms for ships 
 
 
 
18 
However, data could also be altered while stored on the ship or at a remote 
location.  With tier 4 autonomy, it is likely that both remote access and control 
will be implemented since higher tiers aim to fully remove all local crew and 
rely minimally on remote help.  Conversely, with tier 5 autonomy the ship 
operates fully autonomously, self-directing, and does not require assistance 
from remote crew.  However, it is unlikely any ship owners would not have 
contingency options considering the value of the ship and cargo.  It is likely 
that remote operations are possible, used less frequently at tier 5. 
 
Currently there are more autonomous ports in full operation than there are 
autonomous ships.  In these ports, cargo is handled primarily by advanced OT 
systems (Rebollo, Julian, Carrascosa, & Botti, 2019) (Wilshusen, 2015).  
Unlike autonomous ships however, a highly autonomous port will still have 
human supervision and maintenance, as the cost savings are less dramatic 
when compared to autonomous ships.  In other words, the cost savings of 
removing the human element from ports is not worth the risk.  In the future, 
however, ports are likely to increase the number of autonomous services they 
provide, especially as other ships become more autonomous.  For example, if 
autonomous ships are easier to direct, port congestion is likely to increase and 
more autonomous traffic management may be needed to support human-
based decisions.  The majority of all the autonomous ports in existence also 
primarily deal with cargo ships and containers.  This was a relatively easy 
first step, as containers have set dimensions, weight, and already have 
machine-readable data such as origin, contents, etc.   As ports and ships 
develop, there is a drive for other autonomous services, such as autonomous 
operations for oil and gas.  This industry is striving towards fully autonomous 
operations by 2030 to 2035 (Venables, 2018), especially as hundreds of oil 
and gas structures, in the marine environment, approach decommissioning 
(Jones, Gates, Huvenne, Philips, & Bett, 2019).  Additionally, smaller ports 
and offshore structures may also incorporate more autonomy as time passes. 
 
The number of devices that the maritime sector could contribute to the 
worldwide network is extensive, as discussed in the IoT subsection. In 
particular, the rise of autonomous ships and ports will mean more sensors and 
devices are needed to support all operations (Brandy, 2018).  With increased 
more automation, monitoring and actions such as invoicing and moving cargo 
will generate, and require, more digitally collected data, drastically increasing 
the number of IoT devices. If sensors and other monitoring devices become 
the only source of information for human and computer-based decisions, the 
cybersecurity of the individual sensors themselves come into question.  In 
such cases data integrity becomes imperative, and so more secure storage and 
data transfer must be provided as autonomous technology develops. 
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Remote Operations, Connections, Virtual Reality 
As discussed previously, there are various, growing, levels of autonomy in 
ships and infrastructure like ports.  Autonomy, however, can be seen as a set 
of several developing technologies, many of which could be considered 
significant trends themselves in the maritime sector.  For example, remote 
communications, remote-enabled control, virtual reality, and augmented 
reality.  While there are several machine-to-machine and human-to-human 
communication connections in maritime operations (e.g., satellite, marine 
radio, internet), the types of cyberattacks and vulnerabilities are similar due 
to the nature of wireless transmissions.  Regardless of how remote access or 
control signals are sent, those transmissions are vulnerable to jamming attacks 
(Tam & Jones, 2019b).    Additionally, if the protocols are insecure, spoofing 
and leaks can occur if data is altered or stolen.  Besides the technical 
vulnerabilities in digital connections used in maritime, the human element at 
sea and shore can be vulnerable.  Particularly if crew become more remote 
and staff primarily oversee operations, attacks that hide or misrepresent data 
can negatively alter human behaviour.  The use of virtual reality as a remote 
control aid could present this kind of IT/human risk.  Hence, it is important 
to make sure digital connections are trustworthy and to set up contingencies 
if a communication channel is lost or determined to be untrustworthy. 
 
Augmented reality, unlike remote operations and full virtual reality, has 
potential uses for displaying digital information at ports but, more likely, at 
sea.  Disregarding security, augmented reality could display more information 
in a human-friendly manner (Baldauf & Procee, 2014).  If displaying this data 
locally, this moderately mitigates the vulnerabilities mentioned above.  
However, augmented reality shares the same misinformation risks that can 
cause people to make harmful decisions since virtual objects are less easily 
verifiable. If a cyber-attack is able to alter relevant data, the likelihood that 
the false data is discovered before causing an incident goes down.  This type 
of risk has been speculated about before with eAtons, virtual markers that 
could be spoofed to cause an accident (Tam & Jones, 2019b).  Considering 
the emergence of newer technology, augmented systems for ships could 
widen the range of accident outcomes, as there could be more ways to trick 
people.  For example, using augmented navigation systems in areas difficult 
to navigate (e.g., shifting ice without physical markers), can make navigation 
much easier.  More specifically, artic waters have highlighted the benefits of 
virtual beacons and augmented reality for ships (Frydenberg, Nordby, & 
Eikenes, 2018).  In this case, a misinforming change to the data fed into 
augmented reality programs could shift the correct shipping lane on the screen 
enough to increase the probability of a collision if the crew is not vigilant. 
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Internet-of-Things  
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) concept is that many types of devices are 
interconnected, via the Internet, and sharing significant amounts of data.  As 
this definition is extremely broad, IoT networks in the modern world are 
inherently massive and complex when considering the number and types of 
internet-connected devices available.  Specific to maritime, in a recent survey, 
trends showed that 42% of maritime organizations believed they would 
benefit from additional IoT solutions and 2.5 million dollars will be spent on 
IoT over the next three years, more than either cloud computing or big data 
analytics (Brandy, 2018).  Again, cost savings are driving IoT solutions in 
maritime, with predicted cost savings up to 14% over the next five years.  
Specific to this sector, IoT devices can be categorized broadly into personal, 
ship, and port devices. As illustrated in Figure 3, personal and ship/port 
devices are separated because personal devices are generic technology in a 
maritime context, while ship and port devices are more bespoke to the 
maritime sector. The underlying technology may be more commonplace; 
however, this does result in different cyber risks.  For example, while ships 
and planes may use similar navigation systems, they diverge enough that the 
security risks will differ, in addition to the different contexts they are used in.   
 
Figure 3 Likely categories of devices within a maritime Internet-of-Things 
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Both IoT personal devices and devices on ships are considered physically 
mobile.   Therefore, in addition to adding a cyber-element of risk, they also 
add a dynamic geographical risk as devices connect to a number of local and 
international network nodes.  Because maritime IoT devices will be mobile 
across several networks, including different internet laws, hardware, users, 
and owners, this drastically increases the risk possibilities.  The often constant 
communications between these devices across the Internet introduce several 
vulnerabilities to the overall IoT.  It is important that these risks be addressed 
as more devices are connected and as operations become more dependent on 
the connectivity.  A network is also as secure as its most vulnerable device, 
therefore access and permissions must be set accordingly.  Sensor-based 
devices (e.g., wind, temperature, vibration) in maritime are also used 
differently and exposed to different hazards.  While many sensors are, and 
will be, installed in control areas like the bridge, many are also placed in 
engineering.  For volatile or sensitive cargo (e.g., natural gas, medication, 
food) it is likely more IoT devices will be introduced for cargo maintenance.  
An increase of monitoring devices would help support a number of machine 
and human based decisions across a ships and ports, as seen in in Figure 1.  
This diversity is what separates ship and port devices most from more 
traditional IoT devices, and defines the unique aspects of a maritime IoT. 
 
Some of the significant benefits of IoT comes from data analytics and the 
access to a wealth of information from multiple sources.  As mentioned 
previously, cargo management supported by IoT-enabled tags may 
revolutionize the shipping industry (Weber, 2010).  Not only would this have 
significant effects on the entire industry, if implemented globally, considering 
the volume of cargo shipped around annually, maritime devices could become 
the biggest device contributor to the worldwide IoT.  It has been reported that 
a single modern shipping ship can host 5,000 data tags and 3,000 sensors in 
the main control and engine rooms (Brandy, 2018).  These IoT devices found 
in these areas can be seen on the “ship-device” section of Figure 3’s IoT 
diagram. The number and diversity of devices today, as well current level of 
maritime cybersecurity skills, have contributed to 87% of mariners believing 
their IoT security could be improved. This would mean that a significant 
percentage of the future global IoT would be dedicated to maritime 
operations, which could have significant effects on the cybersecurity across 
other sectors.  Another factor that could lead to maritime devices dominating 
the IoT space would be if more ships and ports decided to use more remote 
control, remote access, or autonomy, as those would require more sensors and 
monitoring devices, and more communication devices, to compensate for a 
less humans, or no humans at all (Tam & Jones, 2018a).   
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Environmentally Friendly Fuel 
In addition to safer sustainable operations, another area of focus for emerging 
technology in maritime is protecting the environment.  Newer IMO 
regulations have changed maritime operations for this purpose, such as max 
speeds; however, more solutions are being implemented or suggested every 
day.  Technical solutions that change what kinds of energy is collection (e.g., 
tide, solar, eco-fuel), storage, and use, will have effects on cyber-risks.  By 
potentially harvesting from multiple energy sources, such as offshore wind or 
on a ship, energy storage and distribution systems must be able to cope with 
several inputs, as well as more outputs, and be able to control the flows of 
energy with high precision.  Especially on a ship, which is often isolated and 
stricter with energy consumption, a smart grid may be necessary to manage 
fuel and energy.  With power systems using converging IT/OT, there will be 
more interconnectivity with multiple sensors and external systems.  This 
would continue to widen the range of cyber risks.   Energy must be produced 
and stored safely to prevent hazardous outcomes, and the transfer of energy 
must be correct to ensure optimal operations and safety.  For example, correct 
monitoring and distribution of energy would prevent certain systems from 
overloading or systems malfunctioning because they are not receiving enough 
power.  As these renewable energies, smart grids, and eco-fuels continue to 
change ship operations, it is important to note the potential cyber risks. 
 
5.2 UNDERSTANDING AND MITIGATING RISKS 
While risk assessment, even cyber-risk assessment, share similarities across 
different industries, differences in technology (IT and OT), environments, and 
human users do significantly change the risks.  To fully understand and 
mitigate risks in each sector, a certain amount of situational awareness is 
required.  As seen in our survey, those in the maritime sector believe that 
maritime cyber awareness levels need be increased, as well as cybersecurity 
training at all levels of employment (e.g., seafarer, management).  In addition 
to the survey results, this paper looked at the physical, cyber, static, and 
dynamic factors that do affect risks in this sector.  In addition, this paper then 
looked at three risk assessment frameworks for maritime to see if they 
analysed all of these factors.  From these observations, we make three 
suggestions for future research paths into understanding and mitigating risks. 
 
We suggest improving the situational awareness of maritime cybersecurity 
by, firstly, changing human awareness using training, research, and talks to 
spread awareness.  This may influence policy and standards of practice.  In 
addition, incorporating new technologies like augmented or full virtual reality 
into normal day operations or training should be made secure. That said, many 
previous attempts at increasing awareness sector has been hindered by the 
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lack of information.  Therefore, another related area of research should be 
devoted to acquiring data relating to maritime cyber-risks and threats.  One 
way of doing this is improving forensic readiness (Tam & Jones, 2019a) in 
order to gather and analyse ship and port information that is relevant to 
cybersecurity.  This has a more specific outcome to general big data analytics, 
which have so far been focused primarily on shipping operation efficiency 
and pricing.  Lastly, we encourage risk assessors to be aware of the limits and 
strengths of the methods they are applying to cyber-risks in the maritime 
sector.  Even within this sector, there is a significant diversity in ships, ports, 
operations, and national/international standards.  Understanding if combining 
or adapting risk models is necessary would further improve safety. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
The maritime sector represents a significant, global-wide, part of modern life.  
Although the sector as a whole has tended to be technologically behind even 
other transportation sectors, it is quickly embracing maritime-specific 
technologies like autonomous shipping, and making potentially massive 
impact on future technology.  This sector is not unaccustomed to assessing 
risks, as physical risks have existed since the beginning.  However, moving 
forward, physical and cyber risks need to be assessed together as well as 
dynamically over time.  This article demonstrated the importance of adopting 
this by highlighting the types of factors (i.e., human, IT, OT, cyber, physical, 
static, dynamic) that affect cyber maritime risk.  This article further evaluates 
the current situational awareness and three existing risk assessment 
frameworks (i.e., NIST, FMEA, MaCRA) using the four types of risk 
elements discussed and results from a survey we conducted.  This helped us 
further conclude that there is no well-established risk assessment method that 
is completely adequate for maritime, and made observations and suggestions 
that may improve awareness and solutions toward maritime security. 
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KEY TERMS 
 
Cyber-Physical: the relationship and combination of cyber and physical in 
risks, vulnerabilities, and incident outcomes. 
 
Hardware/Mechanisms: computer hardware and OT mechanisms. 
 
Maritime Cyber: the intersection of cyberspace and maritime technology 
 
Risk Factors:  elements or factors that can positively or negatively affect 
certain risks and can be modelled to show that  
 
Situational Awareness: sector-wide perception of issues relating to cyber-
risks within their environment. 
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Appendix – Survey Results 
 
Q1: Please can you tell us which of the following most closely matches your role? 
 
Ages:  
Q2: What in your opinion, are the 
biggest problems facing the Maritime 
Industry? Please select up to five. 
 
74.6% Standards: crew training 
55.2% Cyber crime/attacks 
44.0% Environmental 
restrictions 
35.8% Piracy 
25.5% Over capacity of certain 
ships (e.g. containers) 
20.9% Terrorism 
14.9% Falling price of oil 
13.4% Charter Price 
 
Q3: Which ship systems do you think 
are most vulnerable?  
 
50% IT 
41.9% Both IT/OT equally 
8% OT 
 
< 21  (1.9%) 
21-30  (34.6%) 
31-40  (9.62%) 
41-50  (11.5%) 
51-60  (25%) 
> 60  (17.3%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q5: Are you familiar with risk 
assessment frameworks (e.g. NIST)? 
 
44.3% No 
23% Yes - NIST 
21.3% Maybe 
11.5% Yes – Not NIST 
 
Q6:  Have you received any training 
in Cyber Security? 
60.7% No 
39.3% Yes 
 
Q7: Do you believe that generic 
Cyber Security training would be 
useful for your tasks?   
72/100 
 
Q8: Do you believe that maritime 
specific Cybersecurity training would 
be useful for your tasks?  
75/100 
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Q9: Please choose the one that you 
agree with most: 
 
32.8% I have limited awareness of 
maritime cyber threats 
32.8% I have moderate awareness 
of maritime cyber threats 
31.2% I have a good awareness of 
maritime cyber threats 
3.4% I have no awareness of 
maritime cyber threats 
 
 
Q10: Please select all elements you 
think have an effect on maritime 
cyber (cyber-physical) risks. 
 
70.7% Ship computers 
58.6% State-level outsider threat 
50.7% Firewalls 
46.6% Location/Route 
44.8% Cargo (value, type…) 
39.7% Intrusion detection 
67% Crew 
22% CCTV 
50% Insider threat 
50% Prankster: outsider threat 
41% Company espionage 
74% Internet activity 
 
 
Q11: In your opinion, which Cyber 
Crime threat is most likely to occur in 
the Maritime Industry? 
 
31% Malware 
17% Unsure 
13.9% Web based attacks 
13.9% Phishing/spear-phishing 
8.6% Denial of service attacks 
6.9% Malicious code 
5.3% Malicious insiders 
3.5% Stolen Devices 
 
 
Q12: In your opinion, which Cyber 
Crime threat causes (or could cause) 
the most financial damage to the 
Maritime Industry? 
 
24.1% Malware 
13.8% Unsure 
13.8% Denial of service attacks 
13.8% Malicious code 
12% Web based attacks 
10.3% Phishing/spear-phishing 
6.9% Malicious insiders 
5% Stolen Devices 
 
Q13: How do you think a Cyber-
attack would become apparent on a 
ship? Please choose up to three. 
 
37.9% No obvious symptoms 
37.9% Communication failure 
34.5% GPS failure 
25.9% Loss of navigation 
24% External notification 
15.5% Poor track keeping, 
intermittent faults 
12% Black out 
8.6% loss of engine control 
8.6% Other 
 
Q14: Do you know who to inform 
after a Cyberattack?  
 
60% Yes 
40% No 
 
Q15: What actions do you think can 
be taken to reduce Cyber Risks? 
 
63.6% Firewalls 
58.2% Provide duplicate and 
independent back-up 
systems 
52.7% No external devices 
allowed into sensitive 
areas (bridge) 
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43.6% Restrict use of personal 
devices 
40% Monitor external 
communications 
7.3% Other 
 
 
Q16: What actions do you think you 
would take after a Cyber Attack? 
 
67.3% Engage independent 
backup-system (if fitted) 
30.9% Get vessel to safe position 
and anchor if possible 
24.6% Switch systems off and 
re-boot to start again 
23.6% Continue to nearest port 
or point of refuge 
18.2% Other (inform external 
technician or company) 
 
 
Q17: What actions can the industry 
take to reduce risk of Cyber-attack? 
 
78.2% Raise general awareness 
58.2% Carry out cyber security 
audits on board 
41.8% Vessels to carry Cyber 
“Health” certificate 
54.6% Duplicate / independent 
back-up systems 
10% Other (training, IDS, 
shore-based help) 
 
Q18: How would you test ship 
security after an attack? 
 
85.7% Shore-based experts to 
visit vessel and prove 
security 
33.9% Internal investigation 
16.1% Generic advise to 
wipe/re-start systems 
3.6% Other  
Q19: Have you or someone you know 
been the victim of a maritime cyber 
incident?  
 
78% No 
22% Yes 
 
Q20: If known, please choose the 
closest cause of the incident. 
 
61.5% Malware (Malicious 
Software – Ransomware, 
Viruses, Worms, Trojan 
Horses) 
15.4% Denial Of Service 
Attacks (An interruption 
of an authorised user’s 
access to a computer 
network) 
15.4% Phishing and Spear 
Phishing Scams (The 
mimicking of a genuine 
company to entice 
Individuals to reveal 
personal information) 
7.7% Unknown 
0% Malicious Insiders 
0% Web – Based Attacks 
0% Stolen Devices 
 
Q21: If known, please select the 
known outcomes from the incident. 
 
15.4% Delays 
15.4% Information loss 
15.4% Physical loss 
15.4% Finance loss 
15.4% Unknown 
7.7% Information corruption 
7.7% None 
7.7% All of the above 
0% Reputation damage 
 
 
